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BEYOND PRIVACY, BEYOND PROBABLE
CAUSE, BEYOND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT: NEW STRATEGIES FOR
FIGHTING PRETEXT ARRESTS
TIMOTHY P. O'NEILL*
INTRODUCTION

Consider the number of minor traffic violations that the
typical driver makes each time he or she gets into a car. After
following and observing a motorist for a short distance, a police
officer is likely to witness at least a trivial violation by nearly
every driver on the road. Failure to signal for the appropriate
length of time before turning; failure to signal before every lane
change; failure to come to a complete stop at a stop sign; driving
too fast, too slowly, or driving too fast for the conditions in the
opinion of the officer-all could justify pulling a car over and
issuing a citation. Perhaps this is fair; society certainly has an
interest is ensuring safety on our roads. But what if such
violations would justify not only a minor fine but also the removal
of the driver from his or her vehicle and a search of the entire
passenger compartment including all of the driver's belongings?
What if the police officer was allowed the discretion to engage in
such a search based on factors such as the neighborhood in which
the driver was traveling, or the driver's clothes, or the color of the
driver's skin? Such a practice would be an affront to our sense of
justice. One might hope that these types of searches could never
Professor, The John Marshall Law School. I wish to acknowledge the
excellent research provided by Michael J. Summerhill. I wish to thank The John
Marshall Law School for supporting this work through its Summer Research Grant
Program. Thanks also to my parents for their unflagging support through the years.
I finally wish to thank John T. Moran, Jr., whose generous assistance enabled me to
enter the field of criminal law and to whom I will always be grateful.
*

HeinOnline -- 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 693 1998

694

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

be tolerated under our Bill of Rights. But these practices appear
to be precisely in line with the present United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence on the subject.
On June 10, 1996, the Supreme Court decided Whren v.
United States,' which dealt with the issue of "pretext arrests."2
Whren and Brown were convicted of possession of illegal drugs
recovered during a police stop of their automobile.3 They asserted
that the ostensible reasons their car was stopped by the District
of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department-failure to signal
for a turn; not giving full attention to the operation of a vehicle;
unreasonable speed-were merely "pretextual."4 That is, the
police had no actual interest in enforcing these minor traffic code
violations, but were merely stopping the car because Whren and
Brown were young African-American men driving in a "high drug
area" 5 of Washington, D.C.' This "pretext" enabled the police to
engage in a legal "fishing expedition" in which illegal drugs were
found. The traffic offense "pretext" thus allowed the police to
search for drugs without having probable cause to believe any
drugs were present.
During the past decade, the issue of "pretext arrests" has
produced a wave of academic writing7 as well as disagreement

1. 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996).
2. See infra notes 6-8 and accompanying text for a definition and discussion of
pretext arrests; see also infra note 10 and accompanying text for the Court's
definition of pretext arrests in Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)..
3. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772. The federal drug laws which Whren and
Brown were convicted of violating were 21 U.S.C. §§ 844(a) and 860(a) (1994). Id.
Section 844(a) criminalizes the possession of controlled substances. 21 U.S.C.
§ 844(a) (1994). Section 860(a) criminalizes the possession of controlled substances
within one thousand feet of a school zone. 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (1994).
4. Petitioners' Brief at 14-15, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
(No. 95-5841); see also D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 2213.4 (1995) (providing that "an
operator shall... give full time and attention to the operation of the vehicle"); D.C.
Mun. Regs. tit. 18, § 2200.3 (1995) (stating that "no person shall drive a vehicle...
at a speed greater than is reasonable and prudent under the conditions'); D.C. Mun.
Regs. tit. 18, § 2204.3 (1995) (providing "no person shall turn any vehicle.., without
giving an appropriate signal").
5. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772. The "high drug area" of Washington, D.C., to
which the Court referred, is located in the southeast portion of the city. See
Petitioners' Brief at 2, Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (No. 95-5841).
6. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773; see also Petitioners' Brief at 14, Whren, 116
S. Ct. 1769 (No. 95-5841) (arguing that a disproportionate number of minorities will
be affected by these "traffic" stops).
7. See generally Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Fourth Amendment Accommodations:
(Un)Compelling Public Needs, BalancingActs, and the Fiction of Consent, 2 MICH.
J. RACE & L. 461 (1997); Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI
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among state and federal courts. 8 Yet the Whren decision displayed complete consensus among the Justices of the Supreme
Court. In an opinion by Justice Scalia, the Court held that the
stop was proper simply because there was probable cause to
believe the defendants committed the civil traffic offenses.9 The
Court went on to hold that any subjective reasons the police had
for making the stop-that is, any "pretexts" they may have
had-were irrelevant under the Fourth Amendment. 10
The result of Whren certainly was no surprise. After all, in
cases decided by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, the government usually has prevailed on key Fourth Amendment issues. 1

L. REV. 425 (1997); Patricia Leary & Stephanie Rae Williams, Toward a State
Constitutional Check on Police Discretionto Patrol the FourthAmendment's Outer
Frontier:A Subjective Test for Pretextual Seizures, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1007 (1996);
Janet Koven Levit, Pretextual Traffic Stops: United States v. Whren and the Death
of Terry v. Ohio, 28 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 145 (1996); S. Michael McColloch, Criminal
Procedure:Arrest, Search, and Confessions, 42 Sw. L.J. 565 (1988); Thomas M.
Melsheimer et al., CriminalProcedure: Confessions, Search and Seizure, 50 SMU L.
REV. 1059 (1997); Brian J. O'Donnell, Whren v. United States: An Abrupt End to the
Debate Over Pretextual Stops, 49 ME. L. REV. 207 (1997); David M. Silk, When Bright
Lines Break Down: Limiting New York v. Belton, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 281 (1987);
Robert D. Snook, CriminalLaw-PretextualArrests and Alternatives to the Objective
Test, 12 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 105 (1990).
8. Compare United States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 785-86 (2d Cir. 1994)
(Newman, C.J., concurring) (agreeing with the majority's adoption of the "could have"
test-a search or seizure is constitutional if the arresting officer legally could have
stopped the individual-but noting that the test gives law enforcement officials
sufficient power to harass members of minority groups using minor traffic violations
to legitimize the harassment), with United States v. Laymon, 730 F. Supp. 332 (D.
Colo. 1990) (applying the "would have" test-a search and seizure is constitutional
if a reasonable officer would have stopped the individual-and finding a traffic stop
unconstitutional because the officer used a minor traffic violation to stop the
occupants of a car merely because the car had out-of-state license plates). As for
state court decisions, compare State v. Olson, 482 N.W.2d 212 (Minn. 1992) (adopting
the "could have" test), with Taylor v. State, 111 Nev. 1253 (1995) (adopting the
"would have" test).
9. See Whren, 116 S. Ct, at 1772, 1777 (holding that the two police officers, in
viewing the totality of the circumstances, had probable cause to believe Whren and
Brown committed the traffic offenses).
10. Id. at 1774. Although the Court did note that the Constitution prohibits
"selective enforcement" of the laws, the Court held that "[s]ubjective intentions play
no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis." Id.
11. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (stating
that Federal Railroad Administration requirements that all employees be tested for
drugs and alcohol were reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment); New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (holding that a New York statute allowing
warrantless searches of vehicle-dismantling businesses came within the
administrative inspections exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Leon, '468 U.S. 897 (1984) (holding that evidence
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What was surprising, however, was the unanimity in the decision.
Not only was there no dissent; there was not even a concurring
opinion. Moreover, the unanimous opinion in Whren was written
by Justice Scalia, whose Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
occasionally placed him at odds with the rest of the Court. 2 How
could an issue which had created such controversy throughout
academia and the lower courts be resolved through a unanimous
opinion?
Perhaps Whren is a watershed Fourth Amendment case. The
unanimous rejection of the defense position in Whren indicates
the need to develop a new paradigm for analyzing issues involving law enforcement behavior in the area of searches and
seizures. As this article will illustrate, the defense bar, through
its emphasis on "privacy" and on defining a "reasonable" search
almost exclusively in terms of "warrants" and "probable cause,"
has deprived itself of the vocabulary for expressing what is
constitutionally wrong with a pretextual arrest. The defense
bar's crabbed view of the Fourth Amendment-which has been
the focus of important new scholarship by commentators such as
William Stuntz, 3 Scott Sundby,' 4 and Akhil Amarl1 -has placed
many issues of police behavior outside the scope of the Fourth
Amendment.
This article argues that the defense bar needs to be more
receptive to recent scholarship which challenges traditional
defense views of the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As
Whren illustrates, defense attorneys need to think beyond

should not be excluded even though it was seized under an invalid warrant, where
the police had no reasonable grounds to believe the warrant was invalid); Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (abandoning the warrant requirement and adopting a
"totality of the circumstances" standard for determining the reasonableness of
searches and seizures).
12. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (emphasizing the key role of "reasonableness" in Fourth Amendment
interpretation). Id. at 59. Also, Justice Scalia joined the judgment of the Court in
California v. Acevedo only because he felt that its decision to allow a warrantless
search of a bag found in a car was "more faithful to the text and tradition of the
Fourth Amendment" than the dissent's claim that a warrant was required. 500 U.S.
565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
13. See William J. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure,93 MICH. L. REV. 1016 (1995).
14. See Scott Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust Between Government and Citizen, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1751 (1994).
15. See Akhil Reed Amar, FourthAmendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 757 (1994).
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"privacy," "warrants," and "probable cause" in arguing which
searches and seizures are "reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, defense lawyers need to go beyond the Fourth
Amendment itself.'" It is time to rethink the traditional defense
paradigm in search and seizure situations.
Part I of this article outlines the current paradigm
within which Fourth Amendment issues are decided by the
Supreme Court and the resulting dilemma faced by defense
lawyers. It also discusses important new scholarship which
challenges this paradigm. Part II examines how the traditional
paradigm defined the way the "pretext" issue was presented to
the Supreme Court in Whren and how this guaranteed a victory
for the government. Part III then uses the new scholarship
discussed in Part I to elaborate ways in which the "pretext" issue
can be reconfigured and raised again in both state and federal
courts.

I.

THE CURRENT PARADIGM AND ITS CRITICS
A.

The Two Strands of the Supreme Court's Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence:"Privacy"and
"Reasonableness"

Whren's attorneys had to confront two separate threads of
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. One strand is the emphasis
on "privacy" as the crucial value protected by the Fourth Amendment. Prior to 1967, the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth
Amendment's enumeration of "persons, houses, papers, and
effects" 17 quite literally. Strict concepts of property often defined
the coverage of the Fourth Amendment.18 This ended with the
16. See infra notes 148-93 and accompanying text in Part III for a
discussion on how defense attorneys should consider approaching search and seizure
issues.
17. U.S. CONST. amend IV. The amendment provides in its entirety:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id. (emphasis added).
18. CompareOlmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928) (holding that
the use of evidence of telephone conversations between the defendant and others,
obtained by means of a wire-tap, did not violate the Fourth Amendment because
telephone conversations are not "material things--the person, the house, his papers,
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landmark decision in Katz v. United States.19 Katz announced
that the "premise that property interests control the right of the
government to search and seize has been discredited."2 The focus
was shifted to protection of "people, not places."'" As Justice
Harlan expressed in his widely cited concurrence, the issue after
Katz was whether the expectation of privacy claimed by an
individual was one that society was prepared to accept as
reasonable.2 2
The second strand concerned the interpretation of the
Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.23 Rather than
viewing "reasonableness" as an amorphous standard to be applied
in a case-by-case manner, the Supreme Court has given precise
meaning to the concept by looking to the Fourth Amendment's
Warrant Clause. As expressed by Professor Morgan Cloud, "[I]n
the years following the Second World War, the Court settled upon
a rule-based model that defined 'unreasonableness' by referring
to the specific requirements for warrants set forth in the amendment's second clause."24 Thus, it could be said that the Reasonableness Clause, in some sense, incorporatedthe Warrant Clause;
that is, a search or seizure was per se reasonable if it was
preceded by a warrant based on probable cause.
This, of course, does not mean that a reasonable search or
seizure always has to be based on a warrant.2 5 Nor does it mean
or his effects"), with Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (holding that
the use of a listening device contained within the heating duct of the defendant's
house by the police violated the Fourth Amendment because of the physical intrusion
of the device within the defendant's home).
19. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
20. Id. at 353.
21. Id. at 351.
22. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that there is a
"twofold requirement" for search and seizure cases: first, there must first be an
expectation of privacy; second, that expectation must be reasonable).
23. U.S. CONST. amend IV. The amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonablesearchesand seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.
Id. (emphasis added).
24. Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in Fourth
Amendment Theory, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 199, 224 (1993).
25. See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the FourthAmendment, 83 MICH. L.
REV. 1468, 1473-74 (1985) (noting that there are over 20 exceptions to the warrant
requirement in the Fourth Amendment including: searches incident to arrest;
automobile searches; border searches and near-border searches; administrative
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that a reasonable search or seizure always has to be based on
probable cause." What itdoes mean is that, as a general rule,2 7
a search or seizure preceded by a warrant based on probable
cause is per se "reasonable."
Again, this preference for warrants was not absolute. A
search or seizure based upon probable cause which fell under an
established "warrant exception" did not require a warrant. For
example, one long-standing deviation from the warrant requirement is the so-called "automobile exception."2 The Supreme
Court has long held that the existence of probable cause alone is
sufficient to make an automobile stop "reasonable" despite the
lack of a warrant.2 9
Thus, Whren's lawyers faced a daunting task under this
traditional Fourth Amendment paradigm. They could not argue
that a warrant was required; they had to concede that the police
had "probable cause," albeit on the civil traffic offenses; and since
technically there was probable cause to stop the car, Whren could
not plausibly complain that the police had violated any reasonable expectation of "privacy."
Indeed, this brief description of Whren's legal dilemma
incorporates the basic reasoning embodied in the Supreme
Court's unanimous opinion rejecting Whren's claims. Yet there
is a growing body of academic writing that challenges this
traditional view of the Fourth Amendment and merits serious
attention.

searches of regulated businesses; Terry stop situations; the plain view exception;
search of person in custody; search incident to non-arrest when there is probable
cause to make an arrest; fire investigations; warrantless entry following arrest
elsewhere; boat boarding for document checks; consensual searches; welfare
searches; and inventory searches). Bradley lists six other exceptions to the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Id.; see also California
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that there are
"nearly 20... exceptions" to the warrant requirement).
26. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1967) (noting that a police officer
can search and seize a person in appropriate circumstances, even if the officer does
not have probable cause to arrest the person).
27. But cf. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 581-82 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the issuance of warrants
unless supported by probable cause, and probable cause does not extend to thirdparty possession of possible documentary evidence).
28. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
29. See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-95 (1985) (holding that probable
cause to believe a vehicle contains contraband is constitutionally sufficient to allow
the police to search the vehicle).
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The Critique of the TraditionalParadigm
1.

The Limits of "Privacy"

Professor William Stuntz has offered a challenging critique
of the primacy of privacy in Fourth Amendment law. Stuntz
notes that "[p]rivacy, at least as the word is used in criminal
procedure, protects the interest in keeping information out of the
government's hands."' But, although this certainly has relevance
to Fourth Amendment values, Stuntz contends it does not go far
enough. It fails to sufficiently regulate police behavior. Stuntz
observes that, although "[a] focus on privacy has led to a great
deal of law... about what police officers can see[,] [t]he doctrine
pays a good deal less attention to what police officers can do."31
As Stuntz views the problem:
The Supreme Court penalizes an officer for turning over a
stereo turntable to look at a serial number without sufficient
cause, but the same Court ignores unprovoked police violence
during the course of an otherwise legal search of a private
home. The law requires more of a justification for searching
a suspect's pockets than for grabbing him, spinning him
around, and shoving him against the wall of a building. 2
Why this inordinate emphasis on privacy? Stuntz traces this
theme back to the nineteenth century.33 For most of the first
century of this nation's history, the Supreme Court had very little
to say about the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment at
that time had no application to the states,34 and the states
30. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1017.
31. Id. at 1068 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 1043 (citations omitted). The case to which Professor Stuntz refers
is Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). In Hicks, the police entered the defendant's
apartment to investigate a report of gunfire. Id. at 323. During the course of their
search, one of the officers noticed a stereo system which "seemed out of place in the
squalid and otherwise ill-appointed... apartment." Id. The police officer suspected
that the stereo equipment was stolen so he read the serial numbers which required
him to move some of the components. The officer was advised that the equipment
was stolen in an armed robbery so he immediately arrested the defendants and
seized the equipment. The court found this search and seizure to be a violation of the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 329.
33. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 1017 (noting that "privacy protection" dates back
to Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)). For a discussion of Boyd, see infra
notes 36-48 and accompanying text.
34. See generally Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that
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conducted the vast majority of the nation's criminal prosecutions."5
The first famous Fourth Amendment case was, ironically, a
civil in rein case decided in 1886. Boyd v. United States 6
concerned the federal government's claim that Boyd had lied
about the contents of shipments of glass in order to evade taxes.3 7
The federal government brought a forfeiture action against thirtyfive cases of glass. Pursuant to the federal statute,3 8 the government served Boyd with a subpoena for the invoices of twenty-nine
of the cases thathad been shipped. 9 Over his objection that the
subpoena was unconstitutional, Boyd produced the invoices.4 ° At
the trial level, the government prevailed on its forfeiture claim.4 '
But the United States Supreme Court reversed, agreeing
with Boyd that the subpoena was unconstitutional.4 2 The Court
characterized a subpoena which requests papers as the functional
equivalent of a search and seizure.43 The Court cited the
eighteenth-century English case of Entick v. Carrington" for the
proposition that government was forbidden to seize personal
documents to be used as evidence against their maker.45 Thus,
Boyd found a Fourth Amendment violation.
The Court also characterized the subpoena as, in effect,
compelling a person to be a witness against himself. Thus, as
the amendments contained in the Bill of Rights apply only to the federal
government).
35. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 146
(1997) (noting that originally, the Supreme Court did not have general appellate
jurisdiction over federal criminal cases, and that the Court did not obtain such
jurisdiction until 1891).
36. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
37. See id. at 617-18.
38. The action was based on "[t]he 5th section of the act of June 22, 1874,
entitled 'An Act to amend the customs revenue laws,' &c., which section authorizes
a court of the United States ... to require the defendant or claimant to produce in
court his private books, invoices and papers, or else the allegations of the
[government] attorney to be taken as confessed." See id. at 616.
39. See id. at 618.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See Boyd v.United States, 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886).
43. See id. at 622.
44. 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
45. See Boyd, 116 U.S. at 626. Entick involved a trespass for entering the
plaintiff's house and searching his desk and papers. See id. (discussing Entick v.
Carrington). The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and the English appellate
courts upheld the verdict-establishing one of the "landmarks of English liberty,"
which influenced the creation of the Fourth Amendment. See id.
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Boyd memorably stated, "the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run
almost into each other." 6
Taken literally, Boyd is a breath-taking opinion. If it were
true that the government has no constitutional right to ever
obtain a person's record keeping, then the modern regulatory
state would have been an impossibility. Indeed, Professor Stuntz
argues that "it may be fair to say that at about the time of
Lochner v. New York, Fourth and Fifth Amendment law posed a
greater threat to activist government, at least at the federal level,
than did substantive due process." 7 Similarly, Akhil Amar has
characterized Boyd as "our old friend, Lochner-era property
fetishism, dressed up as a textual argument." 8 Just as Lochner
perversely found bakers' working hours to be immune from
governmental control,4 9 so did Boyd hold that the Constitution
somehow protected the privacy of business receipts.
As Professor Stuntz has outlined, it did not take long for the
Supreme Court to begin cutting back on Boyd.5 ° In Hale v.
Henkel, a secretary-treasurer of a corporation objected to a
subpoena issued pursuant to a Sherman Act investigation.5 1 The
subpoena requested all documents relating to the corporation's
dealings with six other firms. The corporation raised several
objections including, inter alia, that the subpoena constituted an
illegal search and seizure and that it violated the privilege
against self-incrimination under Boyd v. United States."
A solid victory for the corporation might well have gutted a
variety of federal regulatory schemes. That the Court was aware
of this fact can be seen in its language rejecting the self-incrimination claim: "[T]he privilege claimed would practically nullify
the whole act of Congress. Of what use would it be for the
legislature to declare these combinations unlawful if the judicial
power may close the door of access to every available source of
information upon the subject?"5 3 And, although the Court found

46. Id. at 630.
47. William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Originsof CriminalProcedure,105 YALE
L.J. 393, 428 (1995) (referring to Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)).
48. Amar, supra note 15, at 791.
49. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
50. See Stuntz, supra note 47, at 428-30.
51. See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906). For additional discussion of the
decision, see Stuntz, supra note 47, at 428-33.
52. Hale, 201 U.S. at 50.
53. Id. at 70.
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that the subpoena in Hale constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure, it seriously undermined its seemingly categorical
holding in Boyd with the following language: "[W]e do not wish to
be understood as holding that an examination of the books of a
corporation, if duly authorized by act of Congress, would constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth
Amendment."54
Hale, Stuntz argues, marked the beginning of the end for
Boyd.55 It was the first in a series of decisions that, although
never formally overruling Boyd, succeeded in draining it of most
of its vitality.5" Although Boyd retained an honored place for its
language offering a rousing defense of the concept of privacy, its
practical effect was quite small. As Stuntz describes the situation, "It is as if... instead of repudiating Lochner, the court had
repeatedly reaffirmed it-but applied it only to laws regulating
bakers."57
Yet a constitutional development in the mid-twentieth
century once again brought Boyd and its progeny to the forefront
of constitutional law. That event was the Supreme Court's
decision to apply the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment
to the states through the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.58 Suddenly it was imperative for the
Court to give shape and substance to Fourth Amendment
guarantees now applicable to the criminal justice systems of all
fifty states.
Prior to this, the Supreme Court's control over state criminal
justice systems-to the extent that it exercised any control-was
solely through substantive use of the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause. Many of the Court's rulings focused spe-

54. Id. at 77.
55. See Stuntz, supra note 47, at 430 (stating that "[t]he notion of any Boyd-

type protection... whether grounded in the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth, was
dead").
56. Id. at 432 (discussing how Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927),
and Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), further limited Boyd).
57. Id. at 433.
58. Compare Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), with Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). Although Wolf found that the principles of the Fourth Amendment were
included in the concept of Due Process found in the Fourteenth Amendment, Mapp
made the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applicable to the states and
is thus commonly recognized as the case which "selectively incorporated" the Fourth
Amendment and made it completely applicable to the states.
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cifically on police behavior, such as violence used against suspects
to obtain confessions.5 9
However Boyd and its progeny switched the focus from the
behavior of the police under the substantive due process standard
to the privacy rights of the individual. Even though much of the
force of Boyd had been dissipated by the Court's civil decisions
upholding the regulatory power of government, the privacy
vocabulary had survived. Professor Stuntz notes that selective
incorporation "changed the purpose of constitutional regulation,
from the due process cases' focus on police coercion and violence
to the Fourth and Fifth Amendments' traditional emphasis on
privacy, autonomy, and the ability of individuals to keep information to themselves."6 ° Thus, after the selective incorporation of
the Fourth Amendment, police behavior per se now took a back
seat to considerations of the privacy of citizens.
A jurisprudence focused on police behavior will regularly deal
with issues such as the proper use of force in serving warrants
and making searches. A jurisprudence based on privacy, on the
other hand, will tend to debate what a police officer can and
cannot examine.
Professor Stuntz is not alone in his doubts about privacy
being the primary Fourth Amendment value. Scott Sundby has
also offered a trenchant critique in this area. 6 ' Sundby argues
that privacy-epitomized by Justice Brandeis' formulation of "the

59. See, e.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).

In Brown, the

defendants, all African-Americans, were found guilty of murder and sentenced to
death. See id. at 279. The only evidence the state presented was a confession by
each defendant. Other than these confessions, "there was no evidence sufficient to
warrant the submission of the case to the jury." Id. The defendants objected to the
admissibility of this evidence arguing that the police obtained the confessions
through the use of physical violence. See id. at 279-80. The police officer in charge
had repeatedly hanged one of the defendants from a tree and whipped him in an
attempt to obtain a confession. See id. at 281. The police used the same tactics on
the other defendants. See id. at 282. All defendants confessed to committing the
crime. In holding that the use of the confessions during the trial was a "clear denial
of due process," the Court stated that "[iut would be difficult to conceive of methods
more revolting to the sense of justice than those taken to procure the confessions."
Id. at 286. The Court reasoned that the Due Process Clause requires state action to
be consistent with "fundamental principles of liberty and justice." Id. (quoting
Herbert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316 (1926)). The Court further reasoned that
cases that rest on admissions obtained through the use of physical violence are
merely pretenses of a trial, violative of the Due Process Clause. See id.
60. Stuntz, supra note 47, at 439.
61. See, e.g., Sundby, supra note 14.
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right to be let alone""-no longer "fully captures the Fourth
Amendment's role as a meaningful regulator of governmentcitizen interactions."63 He notes that the realities of the modern
world-including the increase of government regulation and the
startling advances in electronic technology-militate against the
concept of privacy being an effective measuring stick for Fourth
Amendment values. He observes that courts increasingly see
privacy not as an aspirational value, but rather as an empirical
fact. For example, if, as a matter of fact, a person's activities
could be monitored from an airplane 4 or a helicopter" then, as a
matter of law, that person lacks an interest in privacy in those
activities cognizable under the Fourth Amendment. Sundby
contends that a new metaphor is needed. He suggests that
privacy should be replaced with the goal of establishing mutual
trust between government and citizens. 6 This would shift the

62. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
63. Sundby, supra note 14, at 1775.
64. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (holding that a warrantless
observation, from a private airplane, of the defendant's fenced-in yard did not violate
the Fourth Amendment). The police officers, acting on an anonymous tip, observed
marijuana plants growing in the defendant's backyard. See id. at 207. The Court
concluded that the defendant could not have a reasonable expectation that "his
garden is protected from such observation." Id. at 214. The Court based its
reasoning on the fact that any member of the public who might fly over the
defendant's house would be able to see the marijuana. See id. at 215. The Court
further reasoned that such observation is exactly what a judge requires to issue a
warrant. See id. at 213.
65. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989). Similar to Ciraolo, the police
officers, acting pursuant to an anonymous tip, observed marijuana plants in the
defendant's greenhouse while circling over the defendant's house in a helicopter. See
id. at 445. In holding that there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment, the
Court reasoned that the defendant could have no expectation of privacy since the
greenhouse's sides and roof were open, thereby allowing anybody who flew over to
see its contents. The Court held that the fact the observation was made from the
unique vantage of a helicopter was not determinative since the helicopter was not
violating the law and it was not shown to be unreasonable to expect that a helicopter
might fly over the defendant's property. See id.
66. See Sundby, supra note 14, at 1777-78 (arguing that implicit in the
Constitution, and thus the Fourth Amendment, is the notion of "reciprocal trust"
between the government and its citizens). Professor Sundby maintains that the
government needs to trust the citizens to exercise their liberties responsibly, and
that this trust implicates the Fourth Amendment. Sundby continues:
Even a rudimentary comparison of democratic to totalitarian and
anarchist states demonstrates the central role that government-citizen
trust plays in a free society. Totalitarian regimes maintain power not
through the consent of the governed but by physical, economic, and
psychological control over the populace. Such governments exercise
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focus from the privacy expectations of the individual to what
behavior we, as citizens, demand from our police.
Thus, doubts concerning the role of privacy as the prime
value of the Fourth Amendment are being expressed in the
academic literature. Yet there is another challenge being made
against the traditional paradigm. This one questions the primacy
of the Warrant Clause itself.
2.

The Limits of the Warrant Clause

The United States Supreme Court has long expressed a
preference for warrants. Half a century ago the Court noted that
"[i]t is a cardinal rule that, in seizing goods and articles, law
enforcement agents must secure and use search warrants
whenever reasonably practicable."6 In the landmark case of Katz
v. United States,"8 the Court was even more explicit: "[S]earches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by
judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions."6 9
This "warrant preference" position has always had its share
of critics both on the Court ° and off.7 Professor Telford Taylor
control through a variety of means, but among the most essential is the
use of the police power to reinforce the message that the government is
superior and in control of the individual. Measures such as identification
checkpoints, random searches, the monitoring of communications, and
the widespread use of informants not only are means of keeping track of
the citizenry, but also act as continuous symbolic reminders, that the
citizenry is dominated by the government. Far from fostering trust, the
government's actions convey a message of distrust in order to perpetuate
control of the citizenry.
Id. Sundby further argues that when the citizenry does not trust the government,
it will look to other means of redress such as civil unrest. See id. at 1778. For
Sundby, the Constitution and, more specifically, the Bill of Rights are designed to
increase the legitimacy of the government because they serve as a contract between
the government and the governed. See id. at 1780. The rights contained in the Bill
of Rights become "enclaves from government interference" which demonstrate that
the government trusts its citizens to exercise those rights properly. Id.
67. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
68. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. Id. at 357.
70. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the purpose of the Fourth Amendment is not to require the
use of warrants, but rather to limit how and when warrants can be issued); Robbins
v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that the
Fourth Amendment only says that warrants which "may issue shall only issue upon
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has traditionally been considered the most eloquent authority for
the position that there is no warrant preference in the Fourth
Amendment."
According to Professor Taylor, the intended
purpose of the Warrant Clause was not to make warrants
mandatory, but rather to limit the ability of the executive to
obtain warrants in the first place.7 3
Akhil Amar has recently echoed Professor Taylor's position.
Amar contends that warrants were "friends of the searcher, not
the searched."74 This is because a valid warrant provided an
absolute defense for the executive in any trespass suit brought by
the victim of a search against the government. Amar has argued
that "juries, not judges, are the heroes of the Founders' Fourth
Amendment story."75 If a jury found that a warrantless search or
seizure was unreasonable, the jury could award damages.76 Thus,
the purpose of the Warrant Clause was not to make warrants
mandatory for all searches and seizures, but rather to make it
difficult for the executive to obtain a warrant in those cases in
which the executive was attempting to immunize itself from
possible damages arising out of a questionable search and
seizure.7 7
This position stands in bold contrast to the Supreme Court's
current approach to Fourth Amendment issues. In a search and
seizure situation, the Court looks first to the Warrant Clause to
determine if a warrant was properly issued. If there was no
warrant, the Court then looks to the other clause of the Fourth
Amendment-the Reasonableness Clause 7 -to determine if there
was a proper reason for not obtaining a warrant and if the
warrantless search and seizure was therefore "reasonable."
Amar, on the other hand, argues that the Court has it completely
backwards. According to Amar, reasonableness is "[t]he core of

probable cause," and that it does not say that searches may only be conducted with
a warrant).
71.

See TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

(1969).
72. See id.
73. See id. (arguing the purpose of the warrant clause was originally to limit the
power of the executive to obtain warrants in the first place).
74. Amar, supra note 15, at 774.
75. Id. at 771.
76. See id. at 774.
77. See id. at 774-75.
78. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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the Fourth Amendment."79 The Warrant Clause only exists to
govern situations in which the government has actually chosen to
obtain a warrant.
Although the Supreme Court continues to officially hew to
the "warrant preference" position,8 ° some commentators have
questioned the degree of the Court's commitment. Silas J.
Wasserstrom has criticized what he perceives as the Court's turn
towards use of the Reasonableness Clause rather than the
Warrant Clause."1 He, and others, perceive a connection between
a "reasonableness" approach and a general weakening of Fourth
Amendment protection.8 2
However the defense community should not always regard
the use of the Reasonableness Clause as the weaker, "secondbest" part of the Fourth Amendment. Regardless of whether
there should be a "warrant preference," an argument can be made
for recognizing the independent vitality of the Reasonableness
Clause. Under this view, the Reasonableness Clause works as a
"back up" provision which both complements and reinforces the
values of the Warrant Clause.
The insufficiency of a warrant and probable cause to effectively protect the relevant individual liberty interests was vividly
illustrated in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily. 3 In that case, the police
79. Amar, supra note 15, at 801.
80. See Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)
("reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant"). But see
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Robbins v.
California, 453 U.S. 420, 438 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); supra note 70
(discussing Justice Scalia's and Rehnquist's opposition to the Court's preference for
warrants).
81. See generally, Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Court's Turn Toward a General
Reasonableness Interpretationof the FourthAmendment, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 119
(1989).
82. See id. at 130 (stating, "the result of this movement [toward a general
reasonableness approach] has been, for the most part, a steady weakening of
[F]ourth [A]mendment protections"); see also Wayne D. Holly, The Fourth
Amendment Hangs in the Balance:Resurrecting the WarrantRequirement Through
Strict Scrutiny, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 531, 543 (1997) (noting that there are
so many exceptions to the warrant requirement that it is virtually non-existent).
83. 436 U.S. 547 (1978). In Zurcher, protestors barricaded themselves in the
Stanford University Hospital's administrative offices. Id. at 550. The director of the
hospital called the police to have them removed. Nine police officers forced their way
in and were immediately confronted by numerous protestors wielding sticks and
clubs. The protestors attacked the officers, and all of the officers suffered injuries.
The following day, the Stanford Daily (a student newspaper) published articles and
photographs about the confrontation. See id. at 551. These photographs became the
focal point of a warrant obtained by the police in their effort to identify the
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had obtained a warrant after establishing probable cause that the
Stanford Daily newspaper might possess pictures that would aid
in their investigation of criminal activity by campus protesters at
Stanford University. 4 There was no reason to believe that the
newspaper itself, however, had anything to do with any criminal
activity. 5 The Ninth Circuit granted the Daily declaratory relief
holding, inter alia,8 6 that the Fourth Amendment forbade the
issuance of a warrant against someone not suspected of a crime
unless the government could establish that a subpoena would not
be effective.8 7
The Supreme Court disagreed by hoisting the defense on its
own petard: the Warrant Clause. In an opinion with a distinctly
patronizing tone,88 the Court held that there was no need to go
beyond the fact that the police possessed a warrant supported by
probable cause. 9 The Court curtly noted that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and
public need."9 °
Justice Stevens did not agree. He filed a dissent characterized by Amar as a "brilliant opinion that his fellow Justices simply ignored."91 Stevens argued that the abolition of the "mere evidence" rule in 1967 resulted in a sea change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.92 Practically speaking, the restrictions of the
"mere evidence" rule had thus limited the targets of warrants to
those who probably were involved in a criminal enterprise. The
old "mere evidence" rule held that only the fruits and instrumenprotestors. See id. at 550-51.
84. See id. at 551.
85. See id. The warrant itself contained no allegation that anyone associated
with the Daily participated in the protest or the confrontation with the police. See
id.
86. See id. at 552. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's finding that
First Amendment principles were also implicated. See id. at 553.
87. See id.
88. See, e.g., id. at 560. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit's "remarkable
conclusion" did not "withstand analysis." Id. The Court also stated that "[i]t is an
understatement to say that there is no direct authority in this or any other federal
court for the District Court's sweeping revision of the Fourth Amendment." Id. at
554.
89. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 554 (1978) (stating that
"[u]nder existing law, valid warrants may be issued to search any property, whether
or not occupied by a third party, at which there is probable cause to believe that
fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence of a crime will be found").
90. Id. at 559.
91. Amar, supra note 15, at 805-06 n.174.
92. See Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 577.
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talities of a crime and contraband could be seized by the police;
according to the rule, the police had no right to seize other items
which were "mere evidence." The abolition of the rule in 1967
meant that police could seize anything as long as there was
probable cause to believe it was connected with a criminal
offense.9 3 Stevens argued that "[i]n the absence of some other
showing of reasonableness," a warrant seeking mere evidence and
directed at a wholly innocent person was improper.9 4 Thus
Justice Stevens portrayed the warrant directed at the Stanford
Daily as a powerful example of a warrant which, despite being
based upon probable cause, was nevertheless "unreasonable"
under the Fourth Amendment.
Even Wasserstrom has written of the independent vitality of
the "reasonableness" test.95 He admitted that he once thought
reasonableness was "a one way street to be used only to water
down the requirement of probable cause when necessary to
authorize governmental intrusions."9 Yet he has subsequently
conceded that the Supreme Court has on several occasions found
a search or seizure to be unreasonable even though it met all the
requirements of the Warrant Clause.9 7
For example, in Winston v. Lee,s" the prosecution moved for
a court order to direct the defendant to undergo a surgical opera-

93. See Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 302-09 (1967),
(narrowly limiting Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921)).
94. Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 583.
95. See generally Wasserstrom, supra note 81 (noting that the Court's current
approach to analyzing police practices is to apply a general standard of
reasonableness).
96. Silas J. Wasserstrom, The Incredible ShrinkingFourthAmendment, 21 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 257, 311-12 (quoting Gooding v. United States, 416 U.S. 430, 465
(1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
97. See Wasserstrom, supra note 81, at 140 (noting that in Winston v. Lee, 470
U.S. 753 (1985), and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), the Court found the
search (Winston) or the seizure (Garner)to be unreasonable even though, ostensibly,
they met the requirements of the Warrant Clause).
98. 470 U.S. 753 (1985). A store owner, who was closing his store for the night,
noticed the defendant walking toward him carrying a firearm. See id. at 755. The
store owner was also carrying a weapon, and when the defendant pointed his weapon
at the store owner, the two exchanged fire. When the police arrived at the scene,
they found the store owner with a gunshot wound in his leg. Twenty minutes later,
the police found the defendant eight blocks away with a gunshot wound in his left
chest. See id. at 756. He informed the police that he had received the wound from
two individuals who had attempted to rob him. While at the hospital, the store
owner identified the defendant as the man who had shot him. See id.
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tion to remove a bullet.99 The prosecution wished to show that
the bullet lodged in the defendant was the bullet fired by the victim of the attempted armed robbery, thus disproving the defendant's alibi.1 °° The requirements of the Warrant Clause were
clearly met, since the Court conceded that the prosecution "plainly had probable cause" and since the court order was obtained at
an adversarial hearing where the defendant was represented by
counsel.1"' Yet the Court held that a "compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body for evidence.., implicates expectations of privacy and security."'1 2 Thus, the Court held that the intrusion could be found unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment despite the presence of a warrant and probable cause. 1 3 As
Wasserstrom phrased it, the reasonableness analysis caused the
court to 4"slide above" the warrant and probable cause require0
ments.1

99. See id. at 756. The trial court conducted several pre-trial hearings on the
motion in an attempt to determine the type of surgical procedure necessary to
remove the bullet. At the second hearing, the state's expert testified that the surgery
would not involve general anesthesia, and it would require only a one to one and onehalf inch incision because the bullet was "just beneath the skin." Id. Just before the
surgery, the surgeon ordered X-rays which revealed that the bullet was lodged much
deeper. See id. at 757. As a result, the surgeon determined that a general anesthetic
was necessary. With the addition of the new evidence, the United States District
Court for the District of Virginia enjoined the surgery. See id.
100. See id. at 765.
101. Id. at 763.
102. Id. at 759.
103. See id. at 767.
The Court recognized that the constitutional
reasonableness of surgical intrusions will depend on a case-by-case analysis. See id.
at 760. Nevertheless, the Court, following the logic of the lower courts, held that the
surgical procedure in this case was unreasonable because:
[T]he [state] proposes to take control of [the defendant's] body, to "drug
this citizen-not yet convicted of a criminal offense-with narcotics and
barbiturates into a state of unconsciousness," and then to search beneath
his skin for evidence of a crime. This kind of surgery involves a virtually
total divestment of respondent's ordinary control over surgical probing
beneath his skin.
Id. at 765 (citation omitted).
104. See Wasserstrom, supra note 81, at 142 (stating, "in Winston v. Lee the
Court did, in a sense, slide above probable cause because the proposed [F]ourth
[Almendment intrusion was so grave, just as it has, in recent years, increasingly slid
below probable cause for lesser, Terry-type, [F]ourth [A]mendment intrusions"). It
must be noted that the gravity to which Professor Wasserstrom refers does not deal
with any threat to the life of the defendant in Winston. See, e.g., Winston, 470 U.S.
at 764 n.7 (noting that the risk of harm or death posed to the defendant was minimal
particularly because the defendant "was in the statistical group of persons with the
lowest risk of injury from general anesthesia"). Rather, the intrusion was so grave
because it was the type of state action that was overly intrusive into an area in which
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Similarly, in Tennessee v. Garner,°5 the police had probable
cause to arrest a fleeing felon; no warrant was needed because of
the exigent circumstances surrounding the chase. 10 Nevertheless, the Court found that the use of deadly force in effecting the
arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because it was not
10 7
reasonable to use deadly force on a fleeing non-violent suspect.
In Welsh v. Wisconsin,10 8 the Court refused to uphold an otherwise
proper warrantless arrest based on probable cause because it was
accomplished through a home entry and the offense was relatively minor. 0 9
Once again, the Reasonableness Clause
"trumped" the Warrant Clause. And most recently in Wilson v.
Arkansas, ' ° the Court held that a warrant accompanied by
probable cause is not enough to excuse the police officers' failure
to "knock and announce" before entering a residence.'

the citizenry has a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 767.
105. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). In Garner, the father of a burglary suspect brought suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994), after a Memphis police officer shot and killed his son
who was fleeing from the scene of the burglary. Id. at 1. The plaintiff alleged
violations of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See id.
at 5. The police officer was "reasonably sure" that the plaintiff's son was not armed.
See id. at 3. The police officer ordered the plaintiff's son to halt, and after the
plaintiff's son began climbing a fence to escape the scene, the police officer fired his
weapon hitting the plaintiff's son in the back of the head. See id. at 4. The police
officer was acting under a Tennessee statute that allows an arresting officer to use
"all the necessary means to effect the arrest" if a suspect flees or forcibly resists
arrest. Id. at 4 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982)).
106. See id. at 3 (giving the facts surrounding the incident that gave rise to
probable cause). The police officer arrived on the scene and was immediately
informed by a woman that she heard breaking glass in her neighbor's house. The
woman told the officer that she thought someone was breaking in next door. When
the officer went to the back of the house in question, he heard a door slam and saw
someone run to the fence at the edge of the backyard. It was this individual whom
the officer shot. See id.
107. See id. at 12.
108. 466 U.S. 740 (1984). A witness observed a car being driven erratically. See
id. at 742. The car swerved off the road, coming to a stop in a field. There was no
personal or property damage as a result of the incident. The witness instructed the
driver, the defendant, to stay at the scene until the police arrived, but the defendant
simply walked away from the accident scene. When the police arrived, they checked
the license and registration of the car, and, without securing a warrant, went to the
defendant's home. See id. at 743. The defendant's stepdaughter allowed the police
to enter their house. When the police found the defendant, they arrested him for
driving under the influence. The offense carried a maximum penalty of a $200 fine.
See id. at 746.
109. See id. at 754.
110. 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
111. Id. at 929. Wilson involved the sale of illicit drugs to a police informant.
See id. The day after a police informant purchased marijuana from the defendant,
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There is therefore no reason to necessarily view the Reasonableness Clause and the Warrant Clause as two competing
theories. Rather, the Reasonableness Clause can be used to
complement-and indeed supplement-the Warrant Clause in
certain situations. It is a lesson the defense community should
take to heart.
3.

The Limits of the Fourth Amendment Itself

After this discussion of privacy, warrants, probable cause,
and reasonableness, there is yet another critique which demands
our attention. This argument says that courts need to go beyond
the Fourth Amendment itself in trying to vindicate citizens' rights
against law enforcement. It looks to due process as a vehicle for
dealing with issues untouched by the current interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment.
Professor Stuntz has recently discussed the Supreme Court's
change from an application of the Due Process Clause to selective
incorporation of the Fourth Amendment in its criminal procedure
jurisprudence.112 He focused on what was lost.
Stuntz argued that the Framers, of course, had no concept of
a police force, much less a modern urban police force." 3 Courts
slowly responded to the unique new problems posed by the rise of
organized police. Yet beginning with Brown v. Mississippi"4 in
1936, the Supreme Court began to employ the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment to construct a body of law governing police behavior."' During the next few decades, the Court
the police obtained a warrant to search the defendant's home. When the police
arrived to carry out the warrant, they found the front door open. They entered the
house, identified themselves as police officers, and stated that they had a warrant
to search the premises. They subsequently seized marijuana, methamphetamine,
valium, drug paraphernalia, a gun, and ammunition. When they found the
defendant, she was flushing marijuana down the toilet. At trial, the defendant
moved to suppress the evidence seized during the search on the grounds that the
officers failed to "knock and announce" before entering the home. See id. at 930.
112. See generally Stuntz, supra note 47, at 433-46 (discussing the Court's
selective incorporation of portions of the Bill of Rights through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect individual rights from abuses by the
state). See also supra note 58 for a discussion of the decisions in Wolf v. Colorado,
338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
113. See Stuntz, supra note 47, at 401.
114. 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see also supra note 59.
115. Brown held that the use of violence to force confessions, and the later use
of these confessions as evidence to convict the defendants, "was a clear denial of due
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decided a substantial number of cases in the area of policeobtained confessions1 1 and a smaller number relating to search
and seizure.117 Stuntz noted that these cases were not about
privacy protection. Instead, they dealt directly with constitutional limitations on police violence and coercion.
What happened after selective incorporation?" 8 The Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, as we have
seen, was driven by Boyd's"9 focus on privacy. The result, according to Stuntz, was that concerns about police violence and coercion now took a back seat to privacy. Stuntz observed that "privacy protection in Boyd... had no more to do with the problems
of police misconduct in the 1960s than Lochner or the First
Amendment have to do with the Rodney King incident. Nevertheless, after the incorporation cases, Boyd defined what the law 12that
0
governed ordinary police investigation of crime was about."'
Stuntz is not alone in this view. Donald Dripps has argued
that "[w]hen it comes to constitutional criminal procedure, our
first principle should be due process."''
He argues that "due
process could go further than the Fourth Amendment ... because
'liberty' is a more expansive concept than privacy.' 22 He has
offered his own alternative view of constitutional criminal
procedure based on procedural due process. 2 '
process." 297 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).

116. See, e.g., Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (holding that the
admission into evidence of a confession, which the defendant did not write or sign
and which was only obtained after 36 hours of intensive interrogations without an
attorney present, was a violation of the Due Process Clause); Culombe v.
Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961) (holding that the use of a confession from a
defendant who had a mental capacity of a nine-year-old was a violation of the Due
Process Clause where the defendant was not brought before a judge, as was required
by state law, and the defendant's confession came after five days in police custody).
117. Compare Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) (holding that evidence
obtained by illegally entering the defendant's home to place listening devices violated
the defendant's right to Due Process, but following Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949), and refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to such evidence), with Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (holding that a forced "stomach pump" type procedure
to obtain evidence that the defendant had swallowed was a violation of the Due
Process Clause).
118. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
119. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1986).
120. Stuntz, supra note 47, at 440.
121. Donald Dripps, Akhil Amar on CriminalProcedure and Constitutional
Law: "HereI Go Down that Wrong Road Again," 74 N.C. L. REV. 1559, 1639 (1996).
122. Id. at 1637.
123. See generally Donald Dripps, Beyond the Warren Court and Its
Conservative Critics:Toward a Unified Theory of ConstitutionalCriminalProcedure,
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Not all, legal observers share Stuntz's view that the criminal
cases decided under the Due Process Clause through the 1950s
provided a very workable body of precedent.'
However one does
not have to question selective incorporation per se to see that
Fourth Amendment cases during the last four decades have had
remarkably little to say about police behavior, especially regarding the use of force. As noted above, it was not until 1985 that
the Supreme Court confronted an issue as basic as the use of
deadly force to effectuate an arrest. 125 It was not until 1995 that
the Court decided whether the police had to "knock and announce" when executing a search warrant at a residence.'
As
Stuntz observed, 'The vast majority of the many rules that govern
how the police deal with suspects do not concern the level of force
the police can apply.
Rather, those rules govern what the police
127
can see or hear."'
Thus, the current state of the law concerning searches and
seizures has several broad themes. First, search and seizure
problems are dealt with almost exclusively under the Fourth
Amendment. Second, among the interests promoted by the
Fourth Amendment, personal privacy is the most important.
Third, within the structure of the Fourth Amendment itself, the
Warrant Clause has primacy. Fourth, the Reasonableness Clause
is usually viewed as merely a "back up system" when the
Warrant Clause is inapplicable for some reason. With this
background, we can now see how the lawyers forWhren and
Brown were constrained to frame their arguments before the
Supreme Court.

23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 591 (1990) (setting out Professor Dripps's theory of
criminal procedure based on procedural due process).
124. See Stuntz, supranote 47, at 437-38 n.194. But see Yale Kamisar, What
Is an "Involuntary"Confession? Some Comments on Inabu and Reid's Criminal
Interrogationand Confessions, 17 RUTGERS L. REV. 728 (1963) (arguing that the U.S.
Supreme Court's criminal decisions prior to the 1960s did not adequately outline the
requirements of the Due Process Clause).
125. See supra notes 105-07 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), which was the first case in which the
Supreme Court ruled on the use of deadly force by the police when effectuating an
arrest.
126. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Wilson
v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995), and how the Court used that case to establish the
"knock and announce" rule.
127. Stuntz, supra note 47, at 446.
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THE STRUCTURE OF WHREN'S ARGUMENTS IN THE SUPREME
COURT

The opening of the argument section of the petitioners' brief
to the Supreme Court made it clear what the defense thought the
Whren case was about. Heading "I.A." read: "The Essential
Purpose of the Fourth Amendment Is to Safeguard Our Privacy
Against Arbitrary Invasions."'" The first paragraph is comprised
12 9 for the
of quotations from two cases. It cites Wolf v. Colorado
proposition that "security of one's privacy ...is at the core of the
Fourth Amendment."' 30 It then cites Delaware v. Prouse13 1 which
states that the "essential purpose" of the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness requirement is to "safeguard the privacy and
security of individuals against arbitrary invasions."' 2 Clearly the
petitioners wished to position themselves squarely within the
mainstream view of the primary value protected by the Fourth
Amendment: privacy.
Yet perhaps an analogy would illustrate what is wrong with
this picture. Let us assume that we have just told a friend about
the police decision to pump the stomach of the suspect in Rochin
v. California.3' Our friend responds: "That's terrible! The police
have no right to know the contents of a person's stomach! That
is highly personal information!" Most of us might be a bit puzzled
by this response and would probably respond, "Well, yes. But the
real problem is the outrageousness of the police behavior in
pumping his stomach."

128. Petitioners' Brief at 15, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
(No. 95-5841).
129. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
130. Petitioners' Brief at 15, Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841)
(quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949)).
131. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
132. Id. at 654 (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978)
(quoting Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967))); see also Petitioners'
Brief at 15-16, Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841).
133. 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The "stomach pump" procedure was a result of police
officers witnessing the defendant swallowing two capsules. See id. at 166. After a
struggle, the officers took the defendant to a hospital and instructed a doctor to
empty the defendant's stomach. The doctor forced an emetic solution into the
defendant's stomach through a tube that the doctor forced down the defendant's
throat. The solution induced the defendant to regurgitate the contents of his
stomach. In these contents, the police found the two capsules containing morphine.
The entire procedure was performed against the defendant's will, and was found to
violate the Due Process Clause. See id.
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This difference in focus-between the privacy of the suspect
and the behavior of the police-is subtle, but crucial. For when
the counsel for Whren and Brown began the argument using the
traditional Fourth Amendment privacy paradigm, the case was
essentially over. The petitioners conceded that the stop here was
not "arbitrary" in the Delaware v. Prouse sense because the
officers were acting pursuant to three duly enacted traffic laws;
they conceded that these laws were valid; they conceded that the
police had probable cause to believe that Whren and Brown had
violated these laws; and they conceded that the "automobile
exception" excused the need for a warrant. Under the traditional
"privacy primacy" view of the Fourth Amendment, this meant
"game, set, and match" to the government.
And this is exactly what the Court's unanimous opinion held.
In response to the petitioners' contention that the Court's
inventory cases 1 34 and administrative search cases 35 warned
against pretextual motivations, the Court distinguished Whren by
noting that those two situations were searches "conducted in the
absence of probable cause."'3 6 Here, there was probable cause.
The Court emphasized that under a Fourth Amendment
analysis, the subjective motivations of the police officer are
irrelevant. In response to the petitioners' claim that they wanted
the Court to evaluate how a reasonable officer would have acted
under the same set of circumstances-by examining, for example,
departmental manuals and guidelines-the Court brusquely
dismissed this as "virtual subjectivity."'3 7 Thus, under the existing paradigm the Court unanimously found no Fourth Amendment violation.
None of this is meant to be critical of the performance of the
petitioners' attorneys. Within the confines of the current paradigm, they did an excellent job. The problem is that the Court's

134. See, e.g., Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990) (holding that an inventory
search involving the unlocking of a suitcase violated the Fourth Amendment); see
also Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) (holding that, in the absence of bad
faith on the part of the police, evidence obtained in an inventory search of a vehicle
after the driver was arrested for driving under the influence was admissible).
135. See, e.g., New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (holding that a state
statute that authorized warrantless searches of a vehicle dismantling business fell
within the exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for
administrative inspections of closely regulated businesses).
136. Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1773 (1996).
137. Id. at 1775.

HeinOnline -- 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 717 1998

718

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

current approach to the Fourth Amendment-with its dual
emphasis on privacy and the Warrant Clause-simply does not
provide a vocabulary for attacking the kind of police behavior
manifested in this case.
Moreover, in one aspect Whren's attorneys did in fact make
an argument similar to one of the critiques discussed above.
Overcoming the usual defense distaste for "reasonableness"
arguments, the petitioners argued that, in addition to Warrant
Clause considerations, the Court should engage in a separate
"reasonableness" balancing and find the officers' activity violative
of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, similar to the critique discussed
above, petitioners contended that the Reasonableness Clause
should have a vitality separate and distinct from the Warrant
Clause. 8 The petitioners' brief cited all the cases listed above
which required something in addition to probable cause." 9
However, the unanimous Court responded that:
It is of course true that in principle every Fourth Amendment
case, since it turns upon a "reasonableness" determination,
involves a balancing of all relevant factors. With rare exceptions not applicable here, however, the result of that balancing
is not in doubt 14where
the search or seizure is based upon
0
probable cause.
The Court then distinguished those cases where the Court
had found that probable cause was not sufficient--cases such 1as
43
142
Welsh v. Wisconsin,14 ' Tennessee v. Garner, Winston v. Lee,
and Wilson v. Arkansas'4 4-by characterizing the searches and
seizures in those cases as having been conducted in an "extraordi-

138. Petitioners' Brief at 16-17, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996)
(No. 95-5841).
139. See id. (citing Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995); Tennessee v.
Garner,.471 U.S. 1 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)); see also supra
notes 105-11 and accompanying text for a discussion of Garner, Welsh, and
140. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776.
141. 466 U.S. 740 (1984); see also supra notes 108-09 and accompanying
a discussion of Welsh.
142. 471 U.S. 1 (1985); see also supra notes 105-07 and accompanying
a discussion of Garner.
143. 470 U.S. 753 (1985); see also supra notes 98-103 and accompanying

Wilson.
text for
text for
text for

a discussion of Winston.
144.

514 U.S. 927 (1995); see also supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text for

a discussion of Wilson.
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nary manner."'45 It found no such "extraordinary manner" in
Whren and thus fell back on the "usual rule" that "probable cause
to believe the law has been broken 'outbalances' private interest
in avoiding police contact."'46
The Court thus unanimously found that the current conception of the Fourth Amendment provides no relief for pretextual
arrests. The next logical question is, for those still disturbed by
the injustice and unfairness of pretextual police activity, 'Where
do we go from here?"
III.

THAT WAS WHREN, THIS Is Now: Two APPROACHES FOR
CONTINUING THE FIGHT AGAINST PRETEXT ARRESTS

Whren has undoubtedly delivered a serious blow to the drive
to eliminate pretext arrests in America. Yet the blow may not be
fatal. This section will suggest two ways of continuing the fight
despite the Whren decision.
It should be noted that these two suggestions are in addition
to the obvious point that individual states are free to ignore
Whren and find that pretext arrests are improper under their own
state constitutional search and seizure protections. 147 The
following suggestions, however, are based on the Federal Constitution and can be raised in both federal and state courts.
A.

Violation of a Law Does Not Necessarily Justify Police
Seizure

The petitioners in Whren argued that the issue was whether
a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would have made

145. Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1776.
146. Id. at 1777.
147. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1032 (1983) (providing a general explanation of "independent and adequate" grounds). For specific examples of state
courts using their own constitutions to find unreasonable searches and seizures, see
New Jersey v. Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820, 857 (N.J. 1987) (rejecting United States
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), by refusing to subject state rules that safeguard funda-

mental rights "to the uncertain effects that... will inevitably accompany the good
faith exception [established by Leon] to the exclusionary rule"); North Carolina v.
Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553, 559 (N.C. 1988) (reasoning that a state rule justified the rejection of Leon because it "maintains the integrity of the judicial branch'); Oregon v.
Tanner, 745 P.2d 757, 758 (Or. 1987) (holding that Leon is not applicable because

Oregon's exclusionary rule is based on defendants' rights not on deterring police
conduct).

HeinOnline -- 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 719 1998

720

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

a stop for the reasons given. 1 48 Yet the petitioners never made
the argument that there might be some laws which, although
concededly valid, may nevertheless fail to justify a seizure of a
person under the Fourth Amendment. The offenses in Whren
were three civil ordinances, each of which was punishable by a
fine of $25.' Can something be a valid, legal offense and yet not
important enough to justify a seizure of a person under the
Fourth Amendment?
The genesis of such an argument can be found in Justice
Stewart's provocative concurrence in Gustafson v. Florida.5 '
Gustafson, the driver of a car, was arrested for failure to
have an operator's license after a police officer observed the
car weaving across the center line several times.'' The offense
for which he was arrested carried no mandatory minimum
sentence and was characterized as "benign or trivial in
nature."'52 Gustafson argued that the search incident to his
custodial arrest was improper because there were no police
department policies mandating the custodial arrest of traffic
offenders.' 5 3 The Court found the search proper despite this
police discretion.'
Justice Stewart noted that Gustafson confined his argument
to the proposition that the search was improper following a
custodial arrest performed pursuant to police discretion. However, nowhere did Gustafson challenge the constitutionality per
se of a custodial arrestfor a minor traffic offense. Thus, although
that issue was not before the Court, Stewart wrote "that a
persuasive claim might have been made in this case that the
custodial arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense

148. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773; see also Petitioners' Brief at 32,
Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841) (arguing that "this court's
precedent supports the rule that a seizure based on a minor traffic infraction is
'unreasonable' if a reasonable officer in the same circumstances would not have made
it").
149. See Petitioners' Brief at 40-41, Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 955841).
150. 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973).
151. See id. at 262.
152. See id. at 263.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 265-66 (relying on United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218
(1973), which was decided the same day as Gustafson, and held that a search
incident to arrest was proper where the offense for which Robinson was charged
requireda custodial arrest under local law).
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violated his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."'56
It is surprising that such an intriguing idea has attracted
relatively little attention over the past quarter century. The
Fourth Circuit referred to it in the course of rejecting an argument that a violation of a county ordinance punishable only by a
fine would not constitutionally support a custodial arrest.'56 The
Ninth Circuit likewise alluded to Justice Stewart's concurrence
in rejecting a contention that the Fourth Amendment forbade
custodial arrests for municipal ordinance violations.'57 A decision
from the Northern District of Illinois referred to Justice Stewart's
comment in the course of holding that a custodial arrest for
violation of a business license ordinance was constitutional. 15
Academic literature includes two excellent articles discussing

155. Id. at 266-67.
156. See Fisher v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 690 F.2d 1133, 1139
n.6 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that the defendant argues that because the offense she
committed is punishable only with a fine, "any custodial arrest is per se
unconstitutional"). The court further noted that although "there have been some
intimations from some members of the Supreme Court that perhaps for some minor
offenses no custodial arrest should be considered constitutionally permissible.., the
Court has never held so." Id.
157. See Higbee v. City of San Diego, 911 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1990). Plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of a state statute that allowed police officers to deny
individuals, who have committed a misdemeanor, a field release based on possible
future conduct. See id. at 379. The court alluded to Justice Stewart's concurrence
when it stated:
The state is constitutionally permitted to detain all misdemeanor
arrestees for the usual post-arrest procedures. California has excepted
some alleged misdemeants [sic] from this procedure-that is California's
right. It has also provided that some misdemeanants will be subject to
the custodial post-arrest procedures-that too is California's right. To
require that those likely to continue to break the law be processed in a
custodial manner certainly seems rational.
Id. at 379. The court also noted that the right of police officers to arrest an
individual who commits an offense-felony or misdemeanor-in the officer's
presence "has never been successfully challenged and stands as the law of the land."

Id.
158. See Ricci v. Village of Arlington Heights, 904 F. Supp. 828, 832 (N.D. Ill.
1995) (noting Justice Stewart's position on custodial arrests for violations of traffic
laws, and further noting that no federal court has adopted this position), aff 'd, 116
F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1997), cert.granted, 118 S. Ct. 679 (Jan. 9, 1998) (No. 97-501); see
also New Jersey v. Pierce, 642 A.2d 947, 950 (N.J. 1994) (discussing and refusing to
adopt Justice Stewart's concurrence); New Jersey v. Pierce, 608 A.2d 952, 955 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (Pressler, J., dissenting) (agreeing with Justice Stewart
that allowing police officers to make arrests for traffic violations presents Fourth
Amendment problems).
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Justice Stewart's idea.159 But, on the whole, Justice Stewart's
argument has not received the attention it deserves.
Can the police have "probable cause" to take certain action
and yet this action would nevertheless be considered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment? This was suggested by Judge
Frank Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit in Gramenos v. Jewel
Co.160 Judge Easterbrook noted that under common law, an
arrest for a misdemeanor could be made only if the misdemeanor
was committed in the presence of the arresting officer. 1 ' He
noted that the Supreme Court had "bypassed opportunities" to
decide if this aspect of the common law was part of the Fourth
Amendment.'6 2 Although the issue did not have to be resolved in
Gramenos, Judge Easterbrook noted that "[i]t is important to
understand that 'probable cause' is not always the same thing as
'reasonable' conduct by the police.' 6 3
The concept of an offense which would not justify an arrest by
the police may appear paradoxical. But there currently is a
striking example of this found in the law of many states. Fortynine states have laws requiring the use of seat belts in automo-

159. See Barbara C. Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century?A
FourthAmendment Solution to Unchecked Discretionto Arrest for Traffic Offenses,
62 TEMP. L. REv. 221, 253 (1989) (noting that at least one justice, Justice Stewart,
believes custodial arrests for minor traffic offenses are unconstitutional). See
generally Wayne R. LaFave, "Case-By-Case Adjudication" Versus "Standardized
Procedures':The Robinson Dilemma, 1974 SuP. CT. REV. 127 (agreeing with Justice
Stewart and condemning a blanket authority of police to make custodial arrests for
minor offenses).
160. 797 F.2d 432 (7th Cir. 1986). Gramenws, like Tennessee v. Garner,471 U.S.
1 (1985), involved a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The plaintiff, an attorney,
was arrested for shoplifting. See id. at 434. A security guard for Jewel supermarkets
stopped the plaintiff near the store's exit. See id. at 433. The two exchanged words,
and then the plaintiff ran through the store. The security guard caught up with the
plaintiff, and held him in an office until police officers arrived at the scene. When
the police arrived, the security guard showed them items that he accused the
plaintiff of attempting to take from the store. The plaintiff denied taking the items
and stated that he first thought the security guard was attempting to assault him.
See id. at 434. The plaintiff said that when he learned that the person was actually
a security guard, he went through the store looking for a manager to complain about
the security guard's behavior. The plaintiff was acquitted on the charge of
shoplifting and then brought the § 1983 suit against the supermarket, the security
guard, the arresting officers, and the desk officer in the police station at which the
plaintiff was booked and held. See id.
161. See id. at 441.
162. See id. (citing Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring)).
163. Id.
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biles; yet thirty-six of these states forbid the police from stopping
an automobile for commission of this offense.16 4 In other words,
if the seat belt offense is discovered by the police pursuant to an
otherwise proper stop, the defendant may be charged, but
observation of the offense alone will not justify a stop.16 5 Thus,
applying the language of Judge Easterbrook's observation, merely
having "probable cause" for an action might not-at least under
these state laws-make an action "reasonable." '6 6
Whren does not foreclose an argument that it may be
constitutionally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment-or
at least under an individual state's version of the Fourth
Amendment-to initially make a stop based on trivial traffic
offenses. Analogizing to the seat belt rules in many states, an
argument could be, made that while there is nothing constitutionally improper with punishing people for a variety of trivial
mistakes, it is a separate constitutional issue whether it is
reasonable to seize and detain a person solely on the basis of such
behavior.
While this argument may be made to the judiciary, an appeal
to the legislature may be even more successful. Since the
legislatures of thirty-six states have already recognized the
possibility of creating an offense which will not justify a police
stop, there is precedent for asking state legislatures to recognize
even more exceptions for similar violations. Empirical evidence
could be used to identify those particular laws which law enforcement appear to be using to satisfy "hunches."1 6 7 The fact that this
is constitutional under Whren's view of the Fourth Amendment,

164. See Matthew L. Wald, FreewheelingFreedom:Appalled by Risk, Except in
the Car, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1997, § 4, at 4 (noting that of the 49 states that have
laws requiring drivers and front seat passengers to use seat belts, 36 states prevent
police officers from stopping a vehicle for violating these laws).
165. See, e.g., People v. Edwards, 673 N.E.2d 752 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); People v.
Hunt, 225 Cal. App. 3d 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
166. See Gramenos, 797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that "it may be
possible to have an understandable definition of probable cause even though
'reasonableness' remains as a separate issue").
167. See Petitioners' Brief at 19-22, Whren v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1769
(1996) (No. 95-5841) (The brief quotes police officers as saying, "In the event that we
see a suspicious automobile or occupant and wish to search the person or the car, or
both, we will usually follow the vehicle until the driver makes a technical violation
of a traffic law. Then we have a means of making a legitimate search."). Some of the
"technical" violations include driving too fast, driving too slowly, driving precisely the
speed limit if deemed by the officer to be unreasonably fast for the conditions, and

failure to signal for at least three seconds. See id. at 19-20.

HeinOnline -- 69 U. Colo. L. Rev. 723 1998

724

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

of course, has no bearing on a state legislature's decision of a wise
course for its own state. Moreover, the empirical evidence could
help identify possible discriminatory use of particular trivial
traffic offenses against certain -minority groups-something
was completely irrelevant under the Fourth AmendWhren held
168
ment.
Thus, despite Whren, pressure can be maintained on both
courts and the legislatures to continue examining when our
society will countenance police interference with drivers based on
trivial offenses-especially when this interference is predicated
on racial stereotypes.
B. Limiting Pretexts by Applying the "Void-for-Vagueness"
Doctrine
As discussed above, one criticism of current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is that it has superseded the use of other
constitutional provisions which may also impact on search and
seizure issues. One example is the Due Process Clause. In the
wake of Whren, one theory which merits careful consideration is
the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine derived from the Due Process
Clause. It may provide an effective vehicle for challenging
pretext arrests on both the state and federal level.
The basic concept behind the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is
that "[n]o one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property
to speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled
to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids."16 9 Or,
in the words of another Supreme Court decision, "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."'7 °

168. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774. The Court stated:
We of course agree with petitioners that the Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as race.
But the constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause, not the Fourth
Amendment. Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probablecause Fourth Amendment analysis.
Id. Cf. Amar, supra note 15, at 790, 808-09 (arguing that equal protection
principles should be included as a part of the Fourth Amendment).
169. Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939).
170. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
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Although the traditional black-letter interpretation of "voidfor-vagueness" stressed lack of notice to the public as the basic
due process value being vindicated, the Supreme Court has held
that this is no longer true. In Kolender v. Lawson, the Court
noted:
Although the [void-for-vagueness] doctrine focuses both on
actual notice to citizens and arbitrary enforcement, we have
recognized recently that the more important aspect of the
vagueness doctrine "is not actual notice, but the other principal element of the doctrine-the requirement that a legislature establish
minimal guidelines to govern law enforce171
ment."
When such guidelines are not provided, the result is a statute
which provides a "standardless sweep [that] allows policemen,
prosecutors, and juries to pursue their personal predilections. '1 72
Such a statute furnishes "a convenient tool for 'harsh and
discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials against
particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure.' 17 3 The
doctrine seeks to prevent law enforcement officers from exercising
a "virtually unrestrained
power to arrest and charge persons with
17 4
a violation.
How does this apply to Whren? Certainly the offense of
failure to signal for a turn is precise enough to cabin the discretion of police officers. Also the offense of driving at an unreasonable speed is one a society might want the police to exercise
according to their discretion. But consider the offense of not
giving "full attention to the operation of a vehicle." This type of
an offense is ripe for a "void-for-vagueness" attack.
The advantages of the void-for-vagueness doctrine over the
Fourth Amendment should be obvious. One of the reasons for the
stop was the existence of the $25 civil violation for failing to "give
full time and attention" to the operation of the vehicle. 7 5 Con-

171. 461 U.S. 352, 357-58 (1983) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974)).

172. Id. at 358 (alteration in original) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. at

575).
173. Id. at 360 (quoting Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170
(1972) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940))).
174. Id. (quoting Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974)
(Powell, J., concurring)).

175. See Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1772-73.
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sequently, the Whren Court refused to look at the racial realities
of the case, saying only that "the constitutional basis for objecting
to intentionally discriminatory application of laws is the Equal
17
Protection Clause, not the Fourth Amendment.""
Yet the void-for-vagueness doctrine meets the realities of
discrimination head-on. The quotations from the Kolender case
discussed above show the doctrine's focus on fighting arbitrary,
discriminatory enforcement of laws. The California statute in
Kolender punished any person wandering about the streets who
refused to identify himself to a peace officer;177 the California
Supreme Court interpreted the statute to mean that an individual must provide "credible and reliable" identification.7 8 The
Court was well aware that the defendant in Kolender was an
African-American man.179 The Court's opinion prominently notes
that Mr. Lawson-who otherwise had no trouble with law
enforcement authorities 1'°-had been stopped for this offense
fifteen times during a two-year period. 8 ' It was clear that Mr.
Lawson's race, habits, and appearance made him a frequent

176. Id. at 1774.
177. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(e) (1978) (repealed 1983). The statute
provided:
Every person who commits any of the following acts is guilty of disorderly
conduct, a misdemeanor:
(e) Wh~o loiters or wanders upon the streets or from place to place without
apparent reason or business and who refuses to identify himself and to
account for his presence when requested by any peace officer to do so, if
the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable
man that the public safety demands such identification.
Id., quoted in Kolender, 461 U.S. at 354.
178. See Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
179. See Brief for the Appellee, at 7, Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983)
(No. 81-1320) (describing the appellee as a "black, thirty-six year old business
consultant...").
180. See id. at 354 n.2. Other than being stopped under this particular statute,
Mr. Lawson maintained that he had never been stopped by the police for any reason
whatsoever. See id.
181. See id. at 354. The two-year period was from March of 1975 to January
1977. One police officer testified that on one of the occasions he questioned Mr.
Lawson because he was walking late at night on a vacant street near a high crime
area. See id. at n.2. Another police officer testified that he stopped Mr. Lawson
because he was walking in a business district in which burglaries had recently been
reported. Of the 15 times Mr. Lawson was stopped by the police, he was prosecuted
only twice. See id. at 354. With respect to these two prosecutions, Mr. Lawson was
convicted on one of the charges, and the second charge was dismissed. The Court
also noted the definite possibility that Mr. Lawson could be stopped and questioned
under this statute at some point in the future. See id. at 355 n.3.
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target of police attention. In striking the statute down on voidfor-vagueness grounds, the Court focused on the apparent fact
that this statute allowed for arbitrary, discriminatory enforcement.'82 It placed enormous discretion in the hands of the
individual police officer to determine who came under the ambit
of the statute. Kolender-unlike Whren-looked at the realities
of law enforcement.
This same quality can be found in another case where the
Supreme Court applied void-for-vagueness to strike down a
5 3 concerned the
statute. Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville"
constitutionality of a vagrancy statute.184 A large portion of the
182. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
PenalStatutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 218 (1985) ("[It seems quite clear that the Court
focused on the right problem-namely, the susceptibility of the law in question to
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. That is the only rationale that plausibly
supports this decision, and.., it is the most persuasive justification for vagueness
review generally.'). Professor Jeffries is emphatic in his assertion that arbitrariness
in the enforcement of laws, particularly laws similar to the one in Kolender,
necessarily implicates racial discrimination. Cf. id. at 197. Professor Jeffries
classifies laws such as the one at issue in Kolender as "street-cleaning" statutes. See
id. at 216. He argues that a "rule of law perspective" with respect to the void-forvagueness doctrine explains why this doctrine is frequently used against these forms
of statutes. Id. at 215. Kolender is the best example of the rule of law in action with
respect to street-cleaning statutes. See id. at 217. The rule of law to which he refers
"signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the exercise of government power." Id.
at 212. The rule of law seeks to advance "regularity and evenhandedness in the
administration of justice and accountability in the use of government power." Id.
Professor Jeffries maintains, and I agree, that in modern American society, the rule
of law and notions of equality are closely linked. See id. at 213. With respect to
equality, the single most important concern is racial and ethnic equality. See id. at
213-14. As Professor Jeffries states, "inhibiting racial discrimination is very much
a part of what the rule of law is all about." Id. at 214. In fact, the Constitution, and
thus the rule of law, are committed to "the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 213.
The Court in Kolender also noted this commitment. 461 U.S. at 357 (stating "[o]ur
Constitution is designed to maximize individual freedoms within a framework of
ordered liberty"). Finally, Professor Jeffries maintains that the rule of law "also
reveals the common ground between 'normal' vagueness cases and the use of the
vagueness doctrine to assure 'breathing space' for [F]irst [A]mendment freedoms."
See Jeffries, supra, at 216. First Amendment freedoms are also something the Court
was concerned with in Kolender. 461 U.S. at 358 (remarking that "[o]ur concern here
is based upon the 'potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties"'
(quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)).
183. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
184. At the time of the arrest and conviction, the ordinance in question provided
as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging,
common gamblers, persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays,
common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious
persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
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court's opinion describes in detail just who the defendants were
who had been arrested under this statute.18 5 A picture emerges
of men being stopped because they were black, and white women
being stopped because they were with black men.

persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any
lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons
neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by
frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living
upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed
vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall be punished
as provided for Class D offenses.
JAcKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 26-57 (1965), quoted in Papachristou,405 U.S. at 156-57
n. 1.
185. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 158-60. Papachristou involved five
consolidated cases concerning the following defendants: Papachristou, Calloway,
Melton, and Johnson were charged with prowling by auto; Smith and Henry were
charged with being vagabonds; Heath and a codefendant were charged with loitering
and being common thieves; Campbell was charged with being a common thief; and
Brown was charged with disorderly loitering on the street. See id. at 158.
Papachristou and Calloway were white females accompanied by Melton and
Johnson who were African-American males. See id. All were employed or enrolled
in a college. The four were riding in Calloway's automobile on their way to a
nightclub. See id. at 158-59. They were arrested because they stopped near a usedcar lot which had been recently burglarized several times. See id. at 159. The
arresting officer stated that the "racial mixture" of the four individuals was not a
reason for the arrest. See id.
Smith and Henry, both African-Americans, were arrested in the morning as they
waited for a friend to pick them up so they could go apply for work. See id. They
were walking back and forth over a two-block area looking for their friend when a
police officer stopped, questioned, and searched the two. The police questioned them
because a local business owner thought the two were suspicious looking. The police
officer stated that he arrested Smith and Henry because he did not believe their
story that they were waiting for a friend. See id.
Heath and his codefendant were arrested when they arrived at Heath's girlfriend's home. See id. at 160. Police officers were already at the scene effectuating
the arrest of another man when they told Heath and his codefendant to get out of
their car. The police searched the vehicle, and although they found no illegal items,
they arrested Heath for being a common thief because they heard that he was a thief.
They arrested Heath's codefendant for loitering in the driveway even though he was
standing in the driveway at the insistence of the police officers. See id.
Campbell was arrested just as he arrived home. See id. The police stopped him
because he was speeding. Although Campbell was not charged with speeding, he
was arrested for being a common thief. See id.
Finally, Brown was arrested after a police officer saw him leave a hotel. See id.
The police officer stated that he knew Brown to be "a thief, narcotics pusher, and
generally opprobrious character." Id. The officer called Brown over to the police
cruiser where the officer was seated, and Brown complied with the command. The
officer testified that he intended to arrest Brown unless he had an explanation as to
why he was out on the street. When Brown got to the police cruiser, the officer
searched him. See id. In the process of the search, the officer found two small
packets of heroin, at which time Brown resisted the search. See id.
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Some of the items in the statute-for example, "rogues and
vagabonds"-provide textbook examples of items which provide
no real notice to the public. 8 Yet other categories are painfully
specific. For example, Justice Douglas focused on the statute's
mention of "[p]ersons able to work but habitually living upon the
earnings of their wives or minor children."'8 7 This provides a good
deal of notice to the public. Justice Douglas notes that this
"might implicate unemployed pillars of the community who have
married rich wives."'8 8 Yet from Justice Douglas' thorough
descriptions of the defendants in this case, it was clear, of course,
that the Jacksonville police were not applying it to "pillars of the
community."'8 9 Justice Douglas concluded by reminding us that
"the rule of law implies equality and justice in its application ....
The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities,
to the poor as well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds
society together."'190
Again, compare this to Fourth Amendment analysis. There
the "rule" of probable cause takes precedence over the "standard"
Messy details of discrimination are irreleof reasonableness.'
vant under a regime of supposed objectivity. Racial bias on the
part of police officers is considered an Equal Protection issue,
rather than a Fourth Amendment problem.
Under a "void-for-vagueness" review, however, the Court
would be very interested in just who seems to be stopped over and
over in the District of Columbia for not giving "full time and
attention to the operation of the vehicle."'192 Under "void-for-

186. See JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 26-57 (stating "rogues and
vagabonds... shall be deemed vagrants'), quoted in Papachristou,405 U.S. at 15657 n.1.
187. JACKSONVILLE, FLA., CODE § 26-57, quoted in Papachristou,405 U.S. at
163.
188. Papachristou,405 U.S. at 163. Justice Douglas also noted that this
provision "may also embrace unemployed people out of the labor market, by reason
of a recession or disemployed by reason of technological or so-called structural
displacements." Id.
189. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 158-61 (1972)
(giving a thorough description of each of the defendants); see also supra note 185 for
an abbreviated description of the defendants.
190. Id. at 171.
191. On the concept of rules and standards, see generally Kathleen M. Sullivan,
The Justicesof Rules and Standards,106 HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992).
192. Whren v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772 (1996) (quoting D.C. MUN.
REGS. tit. 18, § 2213.4 (1995) which provides that "[a]n operator shall ... give full
time and attention to the operation of the vehicle").
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vagueness" review, the Court is much more receptive to the kind
of empirical information on police behavior carefully presented in
the petitioners' brief in Whren,93 and never once alluded to under
Whren's Fourth Amendment analysis.
The "void-for-vagueness" cases should remind defense
attorneys that just because a case involves a search and seizure,
that does not mean that it can only be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment. Especially after Whren, it is time to examine other
constitutional alternatives.
CONCLUSION

The decision in Whren is a serious set back for those
interested in the civil liberties of Americans. Yet Whren may
have a positive effect if it forces the defense bar to recognize the
limitations in its traditional approach to Fourth Amendment
issues. As this Article has shown, focusing exclusively on
warrants, probable cause, and privacy unduly restricts the
potential power of the Fourth Amendment. The Reasonableness
Clause of the Fourth Amendment should be viewed as a separate
source for evaluating both police motivations and police activity.
Moreover, civil libertarians need to look beyond the Fourth
Amendment itself. Due process analysis may also be used to help
redefine the proper relationship between citizens and government
as we approach the millennium.
The United States Supreme Court's decision to grant the
petition for certiorari in the Ricci case"' may be the signal that
even the very Court which decided Whren is uncomfortable with
the power of the police to stop, arrest, and search our citizens.
Regardless, the struggle to protect civil liberties must continue.

193. Petitioners' Brief, at 28 n.24, Whren, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (No. 95-5841)
(providing statistical evidence showing that at least 60% of all individuals stopped
by the police as a result of a pretextual traffic stop belonged to racial minorities).
194. See Ricci v. Village of Arlington Heights, 904 F. Supp. 828 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
a/P'd, 116 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 118 S. Ct. 679 (Jan. 9, 1998) (No.
97-501). The Supreme Court has also very recently granted certiorari to hear an
appeal to a decision of the Iowa Supreme Court holding that officers may search a
vehicle pulled over for speeding despite the lack of probable cause to believe that any
evidence of a crime might be found. See State v. Knowles, 569 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa
1997), cert. granted, 1998 WL 38084 (U.S. Iowa, Mar. 23, 1998) (No. 97-7597).
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